Why the Fridges Stayed Open
· 8 min read
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Why the fridges stayed open, in brief
- Seven weaknesses added up. Four are well known to everyone, and the other three explain why the first four lasted.
- Every good practice runs up against a real constraint, because remote maintenance is a business need. A VPN says nothing about what is done inside the tunnel, and encryption does not judge intent.
- Exposure and passwords opened the door. What was missing next was someone to question the legitimacy of the commands being sent.
Second article in the series, after “Hacked fridges: defrosting from afar”, which recalls the facts. In short, on the night of 11 to 12 October 2026, attackers used interfaces exposed on the Internet to reach the refrigeration supervisors of some 700 retail sites, where they prolonged the defrost cycles and drove temperatures as high as 50 °C on some sites.
We did not live through these incidents on the ground, but we have known similar ones. What follows is therefore our analysis, informed by that field experience.
Seven weaknesses
| Weakness | Finding | Why it lasts |
|---|---|---|
| Exposed administration interface | Judged contrary to good practice by CERT-FR. Censys counted more than 3,000 web interfaces of Danfoss supervisors visible worldwide on 9 October. | It is the simplest way to offer remote maintenance. |
| Weak or default passwords | Cited by ANSSI. Some supervisors had an “Admin” account shipped with the password “Admin”. | The password is also the shared secret of a trade. |
| End-of-life equipment | AK-SM 800 without support since 2021, AK-SC 355 since 2016. | A supervisor often outlives its manufacturer support by many years. |
| Known vulnerabilities left unpatched | Not exploited this time according to ANSSI, but published and fixed, without the fix being applied everywhere. | Tracking patches for this hardware is often nobody's job. |
None of these weaknesses is new, for that matter.
Why they lasted
| Weakness | Finding | Why it lasts |
|---|---|---|
| Legitimate command misused | Defrosting is a normal function. Prolonged, it drove temperatures to 50 °C on some sites. | US agencies now call for setpoints to be bounded within reasonable ranges. |
| No independent detection | Where only the supervisor raised the alarm, nothing went off. The EFS, which had an on-call rota, is the exception. | The compromised supervisor is also the one that produces the alarms. |
| Scattered responsibilities | Management shared between the retail chain, the store, the refrigeration engineer and the manufacturer. | Nobody therefore holds the complete inventory. |
According to the published information, the attacker did not have to break any protection on the equipment. They sent a command that a technician could have sent. What was abnormal was the time, the value, the duration, and hundreds of sites receiving the same command on the same night.
Remote maintenance and remote access: why every remedy runs up against reality
Working remotely is a business need. A refrigeration engineer monitors dozens, sometimes hundreds of installations at night. French regulations require the temperature of frozen food warehouses to be recorded and those readings to be kept. Moreover, CERT-FR asks for the insurance conditions to be checked before cutting off the flow of data to the refrigeration engineer. The remote link is therefore part of the security of the cold chain.
A VPN says nothing about what is done inside the tunnel. CERT-FR rightly recommends going through a VPN, but access often relies on accounts shared between technicians, and VPN appliances are themselves the target of brute-force campaigns. As for the contractors' 4G routers, which one manufacturer recommends, they do isolate the equipment, but they make it invisible to the store.
Encryption protects the content, not the intent. It is indispensable, yet an attacker holding a valid credential sends encrypted commands, and the defrost setpoint would have been just as destructive inside a flawless tunnel.
A matter of organisation
The default password is an organisational problem. On one site, changing it certainly takes a minute, but across hundreds of sites, with rotating on-call technicians and subcontractors, it is a project. The guidance published since the attack calls for named accounts and expiry dates for those who intervene, which is identity management, still poorly tooled in this trade. We discussed this in An IAM for your electrical equipment.
In most stores, nobody watches the administration channel. The supervisor both controls and alerts, so once compromised it can bring down both. At the EFS, an on-call technician and the alarms are said to have spotted the anomalies in time, and no blood products were lost.
And responsibility remains diffuse. The manufacturer sells a product, the installer connects it, the refrigeration engineer maintains it, the store pays for it and the retail chain bears the consequences. ANSSI does not have the means to compel a supermarket, and the transposition of NIS2 is still under discussion. For food, moreover, the directive covers wholesale distribution and industrial production, not necessarily the store. Nobody is in charge of the security of the administration channel. In practice, however, it is the site that answers for the lost goods.
Update of 11 November 2026. The Resilience bill, which transposes NIS2, was debated in plenary at the French National Assembly on 9 and 10 November, with a formal vote announced for 17 November. It has yet to complete its passage, and the question of scope for food retail remains open.
Four questions to ask right now
- To your refrigeration engineer: can my supervisor be reached from the Internet? By which path, including a 4G maintenance router?
- Again to your refrigeration engineer: who has an account on it? Has the original password been changed?
- To your refrigeration engineer: does my model still receive patches from the manufacturer?
- To your insurer: does my contract require temperatures to be forwarded, and what does it provide for in the event of remote sabotage?
Update of 11 November 2026. According to brokers quoted by Reuters, cyber policies do not generally cover physical losses, and the war exclusion could complicate claims when a state is designated. In France, compensation for losses caused by an attack on a computer system also requires a complaint to be filed no later than 72 hours after its discovery (Article L12-10-1 of the French Insurance Code).
If the fridges stayed open, what we take from it
Let us go back over the night of 11 to 12 October as an experienced refrigeration engineer would. Four signals stand out: the time, the value, the duration and the simultaneity.
The time and the duration of a session can be seen without reading anything of the exchanges. The value, on the other hand, requires reading the setpoint, and the simultaneity can only be seen by looking at several sites. None is enough on its own, since a night-time defrost is commonplace, but each was enough to raise the question.
The fridges stayed open first because their supervisors could be reached from the Internet, with weak passwords or passwords that were never changed. That is therefore the first thing to fix. But even once it is fixed, remote control will remain possible, since remote maintenance requires it.
What was missing next was anything to question its legitimacy. Who is sending it, from where, when, and with what amplitude? Does it look like what this site usually does? This question can be handled without reading the exchanges, without replacing the installed equipment and without cutting the refrigeration engineer's link. It can also do without the very supervisor that needs protecting.
A last line of defence
The site bears the consequences, while its manager generally has neither a security team nor a dedicated budget, and that is as true of a store as of a workshop, a factory or a warehouse. The site therefore needs a last line of defence, which alerts the manager and suspends incoming remote access according to rules the manager has set, and which reopens access just as simply when the refrigeration engineer needs it. Suspending incoming access touches neither the cooling nor the forwarding of alarms, provided those alarms have a separate path, since the controllers carry on working on site.
In the rest of the series, we describe our answer, the Trust-Buster Cube and its satellites. The Cube is a unit installed on the site, and its satellites plug into the existing installation without touching the refrigeration settings. They replace as little as possible, because the Cube adapts to what is already there, not the other way round. Each time, we say what the mechanism proves, what it does not prove, and who answers for it:
- Observe without reading: the signals of legitimacy of a remote intervention.
- A satellite for the store Wi-Fi: a single controlled door to the refrigeration equipment.
- Listen without being able to speak: sentinel diodes and what they change for the warranty. They read the exchanges without being able to send a command.
- The site manager's rules: alert, suspend, revoke, and keep the proof.
Do you operate or maintain remotely maintained installations? Write to us at contact@trust-buster.com. We will show you on a demonstration bench how these signals can be observed.
Sources
Authorities and official texts:
- CERT-FR, alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012.
- French Ministry of Agriculture, recording the temperatures of frozen food.
- FBI / CISA, advisory of 5 November 2026 (PDF).
- NIS2 Directive, Annex II.
- French National Assembly, debate on the Resilience bill (9 and 10 November 2026).
- French Insurance Code, Article L12-10-1.
Press and analyses:
- Public Sénat, hearing of the Director General of ANSSI (21 October 2026).
- AFP via Techniques de l'Ingénieur, the limits of ANSSI's powers.
- Analytics Insight, exposure according to Censys.
- CTOL, Dixell France guidance and end of support for XWEB EVO.
- Hard2bit, affected Danfoss models and end of life.
- Refindustry, Danfoss and Copeland vulnerabilities fixed.
- FrenchWeb, local installations, the retail chains' blind spot.
- IT-Connect, brute force against firewalls and VPNs.
- The EFS, quoted by Le Quotidien du Médecin.
- Solutions Numériques, the Resilience bill back at the National Assembly.
- Reuters via Insurance Journal, cyber insurance and physical losses (15 October 2026).
This article provides general information and our analysis, not advice tailored to your installation. The Cube and its satellites are the solution we recommend. Any change to a refrigeration installation is decided with your refrigeration engineer, after checking the manufacturer's warranty, the maintenance contract and your insurance.
