Skip to content

Hacked Fridges: Defrosting from Afar

· 8 min read

Lire en français
Hacked Fridges: Defrosting from Afar

Hacked fridges, in brief

  • The cyberattack on supermarket fridges took place on the night of 11 to 12 October 2026. It targeted the refrigeration supervisors of some 700 French sites and prolonged their defrost cycles, so that temperatures climbed as high as 50 °C on some sites. Three weeks later, the same scenario played out again in Europe and at the French blood service, the Établissement français du sang.
  • The attack needed no new vulnerability. It took advantage of interfaces exposed on the Internet, of weak or default passwords and of end-of-life equipment.
  • Yet the public debate often mixed up three episodes and two attributions. It also confused two worlds, business IT and industrial IT.

We did not live through these incidents on the ground, but we have known similar ones in contexts every bit as sensitive.

Now that the commotion has died down, here is our analysis of the facts and the problems behind the hacked fridges, so as to offer you an informed opinion grounded in our understanding and in our own field experience.

This first article in a series is written for site managers, whether of a store, a workshop, a factory or a warehouse. It is also meant for refrigeration engineers, maintenance contractors and anyone who owns connected industrial equipment. It recalls the facts, then sorts through what has been said about them.

Hacked fridges: the facts

The night of 11 to 12 October, in France

The attack did not target the refrigerators themselves but the supervisors that control them. These devices centralise the controllers of the display cabinets and cold rooms, record temperatures and forward alarms, and they also manage the defrost cycles, while the refrigeration engineer connects to them remotely. That night, the attacker pushed their defrost parameters to extreme values, and temperatures then rose as high as 50 °C in some cases. According to the assessment published by ANSSI, the French national cybersecurity agency, the attack targeted some 700 sites and caused at least 15 outbreaks of fire. For a site, this means goods to be thrown away and premises to be inspected, sometimes with an insurance claim on top.

The CERT-FR alert concerns Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC supervisors, as well as the XWEB units from Dixell, a brand of the Copeland group, and it identifies one main cause, an administration interface exposed on the Internet. According to Danfoss, the affected units were mostly end-of-life models, which the manufacturer no longer updates. Before the French Senate on 21 October, the head of ANSSI spoke of “basic security failings”, by which he meant direct exposure, unprotected administration and weak passwords. He also stated that the attack had not exploited the vulnerabilities published by researchers.

November, a second wave and an attribution

The night of 1 to 2 November, in Europe. The same scenario struck stores in seven countries. In the Netherlands, the targeted systems were not on a protected network, as a Danfoss spokesperson quoted by Xenospectrum states, adding that nobody had ever changed their default passwords. Two pro-Russian groups later claimed this wave, a claim that nobody has verified to date.

The same night, the French blood service. An attacker compromised the refrigeration contractor of three sites of the EFS and then altered temperature and defrost setpoints. An on-call technician and the alarms are, however, said to have spotted the anomalies in time, and the EFS states that it lost no blood products.

9 November, the attribution. France attributes the October episode to the Shahid Kaveh unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, on the basis of a body of evidence. The investigation also notes, from the same actor, large-scale reconnaissance of other industrial automation systems using Modbus TCP, a protocol that provides neither authentication nor encryption, but the investigation does not name it as the way in. This attribution covers neither the November wave nor the EFS.

The C4 report

Update of 11 November 2026. The report of the French Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre, published on 9 November by CERT-FR, details this body of evidence: attack infrastructure used during the same period for reconnaissance, use of the FOFA search tool, coverage of the attack by a media outlet as early as 13 October, and traces of Farsi. It mentions other victims in the food industry, including several small butcher's shops, a slaughterhouse and cooperative plants, as well as the concurrent targeting of equipment in small hydroelectric installations, with effects described as moderate. It does not say how the refrigeration controllers were reached, and it deals neither with the November wave nor with the EFS.

The same day, the Paris prosecutor's office opened a judicial investigation targeting the head of the unit and his two deputies. The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs summoned the Iranian ambassador and announced that it would propose sanctions to its European partners, and Iran rejected these accusations on 10 November.

What remains unknown

We still do not know the path the attacker took on each site. They may have used a default or guessed password, while a reused technician account, a 4G link or a VPN also remain possible. According to Censys, the Danfoss StoreView interfaces visible from the Internet fell from 3,004 on 9 October to 708 on 5 November, and the XWEB units from 3,708 to 2,420. However, according to Bitsight, decoys set up since the attack inflate these figures. Is yours among them? Ask your refrigeration engineer.

What the general public took away

Three readings of the hacked fridges then dominated. Each contains some truth, but each shifts the subject a little.

“Connected fridges are getting hacked.” The word is misleading, since it was not the refrigerated cabinet that could be reached but the supervisor of the installation, a professional device managed by a third party. The advice later given to households is not wrong, but it is about a different object. This confusion nonetheless has a cost, because it turns a subcontracting problem into a matter of individual hygiene.

“Why on earth connect a fridge to the Internet?” It is the right question, and it has an answer, remote maintenance. A refrigeration engineer monitors dozens, sometimes hundreds of installations at night, and recording the temperatures of frozen food is mandatory.

“This is hybrid warfare.” This narrative came before any evidence, and the official attribution, a month later, did not confirm the first hypotheses. For a site manager, however, the question of who did it is secondary. A military unit and an amateur would no doubt have come through the same door. Their intentions and their persistence certainly differ, but the attribution changes the diplomatic response, not the vulnerability.

Update of 11 November 2026. Although the designated perpetrator is not the one of the first hypotheses, the official texts do describe a state operation: the C4 speaks of attacks “aimed at destabilisation”, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs sees in them a sabotage campaign on French soil. The attribution changes the diplomatic response, not the way in.

What the professionals said

Specialists spoke a great deal, often accurately. Two shortcuts nonetheless came back again and again.

The solutions that seemed obvious

“All it took was changing the password and updating.” Partly true, but most of the affected units were end of life, so no update was possible. A Belgian installer points out that the installation then has to be physically modified.

“They should never have been connected to the Internet.” That is indeed the first recommendation of the 2014 ANSSI guide. But CERT-FR itself asks for the insurance contract to be reread before cutting off the flow of temperatures to the refrigeration engineer. The link exists because it is useful.

“Everyone blames someone else.” The manufacturer points to its customers' passwords, while the retail federation calls for transparency from the manufacturer and the refrigeration engineers. Everything is true locally, but nothing describes the system as a whole.

The shortcuts

A published vulnerability is not necessarily the door that was used. Researchers had shown that one Danfoss model generates a password of the day that can be deduced from its date, and then an expert invited on the radio and the specialist press saw in it the key to the attack. ANSSI, however, indicated that the attack had not exploited this vulnerability. The nuance matters, because a vulnerability is fixed with a patch, whereas a misconfiguration is fixed with an organisation.

Three episodes do not necessarily make a campaign. France attributes October to Iran, pro-Russian groups claim November without evidence, and nothing links the EFS to any perpetrator. An open door attracts more than one visitor.

Industrial IT is not business IT. There was talk of ransomware, of backups and of notifying the data protection authority, yet the attack neither stole nor encrypted any known data. The system was not blocked. It obeyed.

Coming next

In the hacked fridges affair, the main facts are known, and so are the remedies: do not expose, change the passwords, update. Why are they not applied? Not merely out of negligence, and these weaknesses are not specific to refrigeration either. The next article, “Why the fridges stayed open”, lists the seven weaknesses that added up, and explains what makes each of them hard to close.

Do you operate or maintain remotely maintained installations and see other constraints? Write to us at contact@trust-buster.com.

Sources

Authorities:

French press:

International press and analyses:

This article provides general information and our analysis, not advice tailored to your installation. The Cube and its satellites, presented later in this series, are the solution we recommend. Any change to a refrigeration installation is decided with your refrigeration engineer, after checking the manufacturer's warranty, the maintenance contract and your insurance.