Jamming, Relays and the Flipper Zero
· 8 min read · Updated
A jammed radio band and a broken receiver look identical from the inside, and telling them apart is the hardest problem in radio-based access control, which is why our system treats silence as a refusal rather than as a permission, and it is also why the Flipper Zero, which comes up in every conversation on this subject, deserves to be described precisely rather than feared.
Third of four articles on radio detection in industrial environments, after Who Is in the Room? and What an SDR Finds, which covered what you can hear, and this one covers what happens when someone does not want you to hear it, or wants you to hear the wrong thing.
Three families of jamming
The first family is wideband noise, where someone transmits power across the whole band continuously, and it is simple and effective and perfectly visible to anyone who looks. The second is reactive jamming, where the transmitter listens and only emits when it detects the start of a legitimate frame, just long enough to corrupt it, and it is far more discreet because the noise floor stays entirely normal. The third is protocol jamming, where no noise is emitted at all but only valid frames, such as the forced Wi-Fi disconnections known as deauth frames, so nothing is abnormal at the radio level while everything is abnormal at the logical level. Any detection strategy that only looks for the first family will miss the other two, and in our experience that describes most of what gets deployed.
The giveaways
None of these signs is decisive on its own, and it is their conjunction that makes a signal. A noise floor that rises with no decodable traffic is the classic signature, because plenty of energy is received and no valid packet comes out of it, so something is transmitting that does not speak our language. An integrity-check failure rate that climbs sharply is another, because packets arrive but their checksums fail, which means they are being corrupted in flight, and this is the signature of reactive jamming that the noise floor does not show. Channel occupancy that departs from its baseline is a third, because every room has its own occupancy signature, learned during the observation phase before anything is armed, and a marked departure from that reference says more than any absolute threshold, since thresholds that work in an electronics lab mean nothing in a machine shop. The most useful, in our view, is simultaneous disappearance, because our effectors, the small units placed beside the machines, transmit periodically, and if they all stop being heard within the same second, four hardware failures at once is markedly less likely than something covering the band. It costs nothing, since it falls out of the system talking to itself continuously, with no additional sensor or processing, so the most reliable jamming signal we have is a by-product of the architecture rather than a feature we designed.
What we do about it, and what it costs
Nothing more than a refusal, and deliberately so, because you cannot prevent jamming but you can refuse to decide blind, so detected jamming drops the zone to refusal with a logged event that carries its reason, and nothing in the system replies on the air, since we never transmit against what we hear. The trade-off has to be stated plainly to the operator before the contract rather than after, because the system is susceptible to denial of service, and someone who wants to stop your production rather than enter it will manage by covering the band. The answer to that is organisational rather than technical, with a derogation procedure, a fallback mode and monitoring of radio availability, because at that point we are up against the equivalent of a pair of bolt cutters, and that is resolved by building access control and sound personnel management. It is also a matter for the law, because as far as we know possessing and operating radio jammers is prohibited in most jurisdictions, including the EU, the United Kingdom and the United States where the FCC treats it as a federal offence, which does not deter everyone but changes the nature of the incident from a security failure into a criminal act. A closing note on direction, because an access control that opens on failure has become a green light with nothing behind it, so the direction of failure was chosen at design time rather than suffered, and it is the first property we verify in any deployment.
Being deceived rather than blinded, from replay to relay attack
Jamming removes information, while spoofing supplies false information, and it is the harder problem. The replay attack is the part that is solved, because a BLE advertisement travels in the clear and copies easily, which is why we never treat an advertisement as proof of identity, since it opens a conversation and does not authorise one, and authorisation comes from a cryptographic challenge that only the key inside the badge's secure element can answer and that cannot be replayed because it changes every time. That parry is reliable and well understood, and it is also the last easy answer in this article. The relay attack is the part that is not solved, because an attacker who places one device near a legitimate badge left in the locker room and a second near the machine, and lets the conversation pass between them, forges nothing at all, since the messages are authentic and the signatures valid and the challenge correctly solved, and what is manufactured is proximity, and proximity is not a property you can sign. No cryptographic layer sees this attack and only a physical measurement contradicts it, and time-of-flight ranging over ultra-wideband, or UWB, is the benchmark, because light does not accelerate on request so a relay necessarily adds delay, and it is the only structural answer we know of, and we do not have it today and will not pretend otherwise, since it is a roadmap line and our most visible gap against the Aliro standard published by the Connectivity Standards Alliance. Meanwhile two things raise the cost without closing the gap. The first is multi-sensor coherence, because with several receivers spread through a room a real emitter produces a level profile consistent with its position, where a relay often produces an inconsistency, such as a very strong signal seen by one sensor only or a profile that does not change while the person moves, and that is not a proof but an implausibility, and an implausibility is enough to refuse. The second is the surrounding conditions, because presence must be maintained throughout the period of use, the holder's time window must be open at the same moment, and the access is logged under their name. There is finally the emitter's radio fingerprint, because every transmitter carries measurable manufacturing imperfections, such as frequency offsets, phase noise and modulation defects, which form a signature that is hard to imitate, an active and promising research field that we follow and do not sell.
The Flipper Zero, precisely
Since it comes up so often, and usually wrongly, here are the facts as we understand them. What it does is carry a sub-GHz transceiver covering the 300 to 348, 387 to 464 and 779 to 928 MHz bands, with an advertised range of about fifty metres, and on those bands it reads, records and replays fixed-code remotes, such as gates, barriers, radio switches and doorbells, so against fixed-code equipment it works well, and it has made common a skill that previously required real expertise. What it does not do is touch 2.4 GHz, so no Wi-Fi, no Bluetooth and no Zigbee, and its internal power stage is weak enough that a jamming attempt carries only a few tens of centimetres, so the Flipper Zero alone is not the universal threat it is often described as. What changes the picture is the add-on boards sold for a few tens of euros, which add a Wi-Fi module, a proprietary 2.4 GHz module and an amplified sub-GHz stage with an external antenna, and with that set the device reaches wireless keyboard and mouse attacks, Wi-Fi attacks and much longer-range sub-GHz jamming, so the threat worth planning for is less the Flipper Zero at a hundred and seventy euros than the Flipper Zero with its thirty-euro board. How it is seen is what matters to us, because each module leaves a trace, since the sub-GHz emission is visible to an SDR effector, the most common Wi-Fi firmware on these boards produces deauthentication frames in a characteristic volume, and the proprietary 2.4 GHz module transmits on distinctive channels with a distinctive addressing format. None of these is proof of intent, but together, in a workshop where nothing of the sort should be, they form an anomaly worth an alert and nothing more, because a detection system that concludes attack from a radio signature will eventually accuse an innocent contractor's tooling and be switched off soon after.
What detection proves
| Mechanism | Proven | Not proven |
|---|---|---|
| Rising noise floor, no valid traffic | That the band became unusable | Who is jamming, or from where |
| Integrity failure rate | Frames are being corrupted in flight | Whether deliberately |
| Simultaneous effector silence | Something is covering the band | That it is an attack rather than an environmental event |
| Multi-sensor coherence | A geometric implausibility | A relay with certainty, which only time of flight gives |
| Flipper module signatures | A device of this class is transmitting nearby | Intent |
Every row in the right-hand column is a reason to raise an event and refuse, and never a reason to accuse, because radio detection corroborates a decision and never anchors one.
Hearing is not understanding
An advertisement received does not prove a presence, and a presence does not prove an identity, and an identity does not prove an authorisation, and silence does not prove an absence either, because it may also mean that someone put a cushion over our ears. That is why our system treats silence as a refusal rather than as a permission, and it is the least spectacular decision in the whole architecture, and the one we would defend first.
Last in the series, Is Radio Monitoring in a Workplace Legal?, because everything described across these three articles involves listening to radio traffic in a workplace, and that is not legally neutral.
