IAM at the End of the Power Cord, Part 2
· 9 min read · Updated
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This second part of our series on IAM at the end of the power cord is where applying IT concepts to our domain gets tricky, because five principles you would normally apply without a second thought become wrong or dangerous here, and we go through them before rereading what the regulations already ask.
This article follows part one of the series and continues in part three.
Five IAM reflexes you need to unlearn
"physical access control (guards, gates and guns) to protect a control room to restrict access to a group of known personnel to compensate for the technical requirement for personnel to be uniquely identified by the IACS" (IEC 62443-4-2, definition 3.1.10, compensating countermeasure)
The standards committee has in a sense written our thesis for us, because physical access control is what you deploy when the industrial system cannot tell one human being from another, and on the installed base we meet that is nearly always the case.
1. "When in doubt, deny" is no longer a universal rule
In IT, fail-closed is the default stance and trade-offs are almost always decided in favor of security, but in OT denying access can put people in danger, because cutting power to a ventilation system, a cooling unit, a safety loop or a piece of equipment in the middle of a critical cycle is a safety-of-life decision before it is a cybersecurity decision.
The practical consequence is that the semantics of denial must be defined equipment by equipment, and this decision does not belong to the security team alone, since it belongs jointly to security, operations and HSE (health, safety, environment). Some equipment will be fail-secure (power cut), other equipment fail-safe (power maintained, logged, alerted), and other equipment fail-degraded (reduced functionality allowed), so an OT policy model that cannot express these three outcomes seems unusable to us.
This is a nuance that canonical Zero Trust in IT has never had to address.
2. Connectivity is not an assumption
You design your architectures assuming the identity provider (IdP) is reachable, but in industrial or defense environments that assumption collapses, because there are sites air-gapped by design, WAN outages lasting days, shielded facilities and contexts where connectivity is actively unwanted.
A policy decision point (the PDP of the IAM chain) that calls a remote service in order to decide is one that refuses to decide when it matters most, so the decision must be taken locally and offline, and it must remain nominal rather than degraded.
You already know this compromise in another form, the local verification of a signed token without calling back the issuer for introspection, and it raises the same questions with the same answers, namely signed and versioned policies, bounded lifetimes, revocation lists with an explicit maximum freshness, trusted time sources and reconciliation upon reconnection. What changes here is the stakes, because a stale token accepted by mistake does not merely grant access to an API, it grants access to a machine capable of physically hurting someone.
3. Equipment identity cannot be declarative
In IT, we trust what the resource claims about itself because an agent attests to it, whereas in OT the equipment does not know who it is and cannot attest to anything, and worse, it is entirely replaceable, since nothing stops someone from unplugging the authorized machine and plugging another one into its place.
Hence an unintuitive but fruitful shift, because you no longer identify the equipment itself but the power point, and you continuously characterize what is connected to it. The electrical and radio-frequency signature of a plugged-in device is an observable attribute, and changes to it become identity events in their own right.
This creates a primitive that does not exist in traditional IAM, rewiring detection as a security signal, because a legitimate operator with valid entitlements and a compliant work order who plugs an unexpected piece of equipment into a controlled outlet produces an event that your policy must know how to qualify.
4. The proof must outlive the auditor, not the SIEM
Your logging is designed for detection, with high volume, low unit value, short retention and a network path to a central collector, the SIEM.
Here it is the exact opposite, because volume is low, a few dozen events per machine per month, unit value is extremely high, and the primary use case is almost never real-time detection but retrospective proof, examined eighteen months later by an insurer, a prime contractor, a regulator or an investigating judge to answer one simple question: who powered on this machine on March 14 at 10:40 PM, and on what grounds?
A log sent over the network to a SIEM fails this requirement because the network was likely down on March 14, so you need a local, timestamped, chained, signed and non-repudiable log that can be exported independently of any central infrastructure, and we have written separately about what such a proof log proves and what it does not.
5. The subject is not necessarily human, nor necessarily yours
You are already navigating the wave of non-human identities, service accounts, workloads, proliferating secrets and autonomous agents, but the OT world adds a layer IT rarely encounters, because a large share of legitimate subjects, often the majority on a given site, do not belong to the organization: temporary workers, tier-2 subcontractors, OEM technicians traveling from another continent, maintenance providers dispatched by a third party.
You must therefore federate an identity, verify an entitlement attribute and link it to an intervention order, without ever having provisioned the person, often without a directory on the vendor's side, and with no network connection at the time of decision. This is not a problem solved elsewhere and copied here, because it is still an open IAM problem, and one we find fascinating.
What the regulations already say (that few have read)
The idea that IAM belongs to IT while safety belongs to OT does not survive contact with the standards.
What every standards body already agrees on
IEC 62443 is built on seven foundational requirements, and the first one, FR 1, is Identification and Authentication Control, which explicitly distinguishes three classes of subject: human user, software process and device. The reference security standard for industrial automation puts IAM at the top of its list, and has for years, so rather than an IT import it is a chapter that industry never managed to apply to the installed base, for lack of a technical means to do so.
The same family goes further than most people realise, because IEC 62443-4-2 requires embedded devices to protect their physical diagnostic and test interfaces against unauthorised use (CR/EDR 2.13) and to provide physical tamper resistance and detection (CR/EDR 3.11), mandatory from security level 2, with logging and notification of tampering attempts from level 3.
It also states the honest objection, and we should state it too, since identification and authentication "should not hamper fast, local emergency actions." That constraint is real, and it is exactly why the meaning of "deny" has to be defined machine by machine.
NIST SP 800-82r3, the Guide to Operational Technology Security, places physical security as layer 2 of 5 in its defence-in-depth model, before the network, and its OT tailoring of control PE-3 is unambiguous, because physical access controls "are used by the organization when necessary and possible to supplement OT security when electronic mechanisms are unable to fulfill the security requirements of the organization's security plan."
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 restructured Annex A around four themes, one of which is Physical controls (7.1 to 7.14), and two matter here: 7.11 Supporting utilities, the only control in the annex that treats electrical power as a security asset in its own right, and 7.4 Physical security monitoring, new in the 2022 revision and the physical counterpart of logging. The detail sits in ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clause 7.
Where it is already legally binding
| Jurisdiction | Instrument | What it demands |
|---|---|---|
| North America (electricity) | NERC CIP, enforced by FERC | Authorization of physical and electronic access under one process (CIP-004-7 R4.1), quarterly verification (R4.2), removal of unescorted physical access within 24 hours (R5.1), two or more physical access controls where technically feasible (CIP-006-6 R1.3), alarm within 15 minutes of detection (R1.5), per-individual entry logging (R1.8), 90-day retention (R1.9), escorted visitors with a named point of contact (R2.2), and testing of the access control system every 24 months (R3.1) |
| European Union | NIS2 (2022/2555) and CER (2022/2557) | NIS2 Art. 21(2): access control policies, asset management, HR security, multi-factor authentication, supplier security. CER Art. 13, which most commentary misses, requires "adequate physical protection" including access controls, plus employee security management establishing access rights to premises, critical infrastructure and sensitive information by category of critical personnel, and Art. 14 adds background checks. |
| European Union | Cyber Resilience Act (2024/2847) | Annex I requires products with digital elements to be protected from unauthorised access "by appropriate control mechanisms, including but not limited to authentication, identity or access management systems", and to report on possible unauthorised access. It applies to any manufacturer placing a product on the Union market, wherever they are established, so a US, Japanese or Taiwanese vendor selling into the EU is in scope and must have an authorised representative or importer carrying the obligations. |
| Australia | Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 and the CIRMP Rules | The only regime we know of that names both vectors in the rules themselves, with a Personnel hazards rule (background checks, periodic re-vetting, plans to minimise unauthorised, unescorted or privileged access to critical components) and a Physical security hazards rule (documented processes to control and limit physical access to critical components, centralised management, continuous monitoring of access controls). A recent tightening moved the regime from principles-based to substantially more prescriptive. |
| Germany | Critical infrastructure umbrella act (KRITIS-Dachgesetz), implementing CER | Perimeter security, personnel and vehicle access control, staff vetting and training, written resilience plans, 24-hour incident notification. Outcome-based rather than prescriptive, since the operator determines what is appropriate and proportionate, and has to document it. |
| Singapore | Cybersecurity Act and the Code of Practice for CII (CCoP2.0) | Carries an explicit OT addendum, acknowledging that standard IT tooling does not speak Modbus, DNP3 or IEC 61850, and requires detection of lateral movement and credential misuse across both IT and OT, with auditable log retention available on demand for investigation. |
What is coming
The United Kingdom is not covered by NIS2, and its Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, still a Bill in the House of Lords at the time of writing, will amend the NIS Regulations 2018 and pull managed service providers and designated critical suppliers into scope.
In the United States, the picture is less flattering than the European one and worth stating plainly, because CIRCIA was enacted in 2022 and its final rule has slipped well past its statutory deadline, and the TSA's 2024 proposed rule for surface transport has not been finalised, so outside NERC's electricity sector the binding American obligations are thinner than the headlines suggest.
Timelines aside, the pressure that actually reaches a plant manager rarely comes from a legislature, because it comes down the supply chain, in the security questionnaires and cyber clauses that automotive, aerospace, energy and defence primes are already sending to their tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers, and we have written about where to start with NIS2 and about what to expect in 2027.
What they all demand of IAM at the end of the power cord: evidence
These regimes differ in scope, in force and in style, but they converge on one thing, and it is the blind spot, because they all demand proof, proof of access control, proof of traceability, proof that qualifications were current, and proof of physical access to an industrial machine exists, as far as we can tell, almost nowhere. That is the gap from which part three of this series on IAM at the end of the power cord starts.
