IAM at the End of the Power Cord, Part 1
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Why your last policy enforcement point is a power outlet
This series on IAM at the end of the power cord is intended for IAM practitioners, and you will find here the transposition of identity and access management into a domain where it is essential and, to this day, almost completely absent.
In North America, a grid operator must remove a departing employee's unescorted physical access to a substation within 24 hours of the termination action, whereas that employee's named user accounts can wait thirty days.
That is not an oversight, because it is NERC CIP-004-7, R5.1 and R5.3, and it is legally enforceable with penalties that run per day and per violation, so the North American regulator has decided that the physical door is thirty times more urgent to close than the login.
Now ask yourself which of the two your IAM programme actually governs.
Where your IAM chain physically ends
Let's review the chain using the vocabulary we all share, because an identity is established and provisioned, an authenticator proves its possession, a PDP (the policy decision point) evaluates a policy, a PEP (the policy enforcement point) enforces the decision along the access path, a session is opened then re-evaluated, a log generates proof, and a review closes the loop.
This chain relies on an assumption we no longer even formulate because it feels so obvious, which is that there is a digital path between the subject and the resource and that we can insert ourselves into it, through a reverse proxy, an agent, a SCIM connector, a PAM broker, a domain controller or an application gateway, since the PEP is a piece of software sitting on this path.
Remove the digital path, and the entire chain becomes inapplicable, yet this is the reality for the overwhelming majority of sensitive industrial equipment in service today.
- A PLC installed in 2003 whose only access control is a key switch on the front panel, with three keys in circulation and a fourth lost six years ago.
- An electrical cabinet whose opening is protected by a triangular key you can buy online for the price of a coffee.
- A test bench, a furnace, an autoclave, a press, an EDM machine, in other words equipment where unauthorised use is not a confidentiality risk but a risk of physical safety, counterfeiting, sabotage or misuse.
- Equipment connected to the site's power grid, but deliberately disconnected from the IT network, precisely because its operator judged, often correctly, that the connection would create more risk than it would mitigate.
Faced with this asset base, the knee-jerk reaction of the IT world is to demand network connectivity, "connect it, and we will govern it", but this is an expensive, slow and often counterproductive response, because connecting a machine, and especially every machine, sometimes designed at a time when network security was not part of any specification, just to monitor it, amounts to creating an attack surface simply to monitor the attack surface you have just created.
There is another way.
Our thesis: IAM ends at the power cord, the only universal enforcement point
All of this equipment shares one common trait, without exception, because it is powered by electricity.
A machine without power does not produce, does not heat up, does not rotate, does not communicate and cannot be reprogrammed, as long as it has no energy reserve of its own, so the power supply is the prerequisite for almost any use, and from an IAM architect's perspective it possesses remarkable properties.
- It is universal. No assumptions about protocol, firmware, age, manufacturer or the presence of an IP stack, and the control applies identically to a 1998 PLC and to a machine delivered last month.
- It precedes the logical layer. A software PEP executes after the target boots and depends on its integrity, whereas an electrical PEP applies before the target exists functionally, so no firmware vulnerability on the equipment allows bypassing the absence of power. It is a deny that the resource itself cannot bypass, a rare property we almost never manage to achieve in software architectures.
- It is binary and stateless. No session to negotiate, no context to maintain in the equipment, no client to install.
The corollary is straightforward, because in a sensitive installation the power outlet is, in our view, the enforcement point of first and last resort, with one reserve we detail elsewhere, since power off is not an emergency stop.
This idea is not new, it is simply ungoverned, and three precedents should reassure any IAM practitioner that we are not proposing something exotic.
Locking out a circuit. Across Europe, EN 50110-1 sets out five safety rules to be performed in order before work begins, disconnect completely, secure against re-connection, verify absence of operating voltage, carry out earthing and short-circuiting, provide protection against adjacent live parts, and Germany implements it as DIN VDE 0105-100 while the UK adopts it as BS EN 50110-1 on top of the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989.
Its 2023 edition went further, and in a direction that should interest you, because it defines a role taxonomy (installation manager, operation controller, work controller, worker) and separates authorization ("formal approval to perform planned work") from permission to start work ("direct instruction to the workers at work location to commence work after all safety measures are taken"), which is a static entitlement granted upstream and a dynamic, contextual grant issued on site, that is a PDP and a PEP described in an electrical safety standard, in 2023.
In the United States, OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147, the lockout/tagout standard, makes the point even more bluntly, because on lockout devices §(c)(5)(ii)(D) requires that they "shall indicate the identity of the employee applying the device(s)", so a padlock that carries a name is a credential, and a group lockbox with one personal lock per authorized employee is a multi-holder authorization scheme with non-delegable release, since §(e)(3) requires the device be removed by the employee who applied it.
So the industrial world did invent electrical IAM, but an IAM with no directory, no automatic expiry, no queryable log and no remote revocation, which is 1970s IAM, and it is still how most plants run today.
Switched PDUs. In any data centre, per-outlet authorization has existed for a quarter of a century, since you can cut and restore a power port remotely, but the subject of that authorization is an administrative account, never a business identity carrying a qualification, so it is an actuator with no policy.
ISO 15118 and Plug & Charge. The most interesting precedent, and the one every IAM practitioner should know, because for EV charging the industry specified X.509 certificate-based authentication of both endpoints, exchanged over the charging cable itself, by power-line communication on the pilot line, and anchored in a dedicated trust hierarchy, with a V2G root, contract certificates issued by the mobility operator, charge point certificates and OEM provisioning certificates minted at the factory. The first edition (ISO 15118-2) authenticated the charge point at the transport layer and the vehicle at the application layer, while ISO 15118-20 now mandates mutual TLS, so this is a full PKI, with a full certificate lifecycle, whose only purpose is to decide whether electricity should flow, and who gets billed.
The automotive world has already accepted that a power cable is an identity channel, while the industrial world is still on padlocks. That is where IAM at the end of the power cord begins, and Part 2 covers the five IAM reflexes you will have to unlearn before applying it.
